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THE ALLEGED VICTIM'S RIGHT TO M4ANDAMUS
IN MILITARY COURTS-MARTIAL
Leila Mullican*
I. INTRODUCTION
At trial and on interlocutory appeal,
an accused is constitutionally entitled to the
presumption of innocence unless and until
he or she is eventually proven guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt. Aspects of Congress' new,
wide-sweeping changes to military justice leg-
islation encroach upon, and sometimes violate,
the constitutional protections historically af-
forded to criminal defendants at courts-mar-
tial. However, the United States Constitution
requires courts to strictly construe statutes that
provide third parties standing to file for writs
of mandamus. (citation) By granting standing to
alleged victims only for procedural violations
of a victim's rights, military courts of criminal
appeals will provide an appropriate stop-gap
against the increasingly crushing weight of sex-
ual assault charges upon an accused.
Although the federal Crime Victim's Rights Act
(CVBA)I was first passed in 2004, Congress only
began establishing those rights for alleged vie-
' *B.A., 2005, John Brown University; M.PA., 2008,
Cornell University; J.D., 2011, University of Missou-
ri-Columbia School of Law. Since entering the United
States Navy Judge Advocate General's Corps in August
of 2011, Lieutenant Mullican has served as legal assis-
tance and defense counsel, a law clerk for the Navy-Ma-
rine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals, and an assistant
legal advisor at the Office of Military Commissions,
Convening Authority. The views presented herein are
the Author's personal views and do not represent those
of the Navy, Department of Defense, or United States
government. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a), (d)(3) (2015).
tims, 2 namely victims of rape and sexual assault,
in the military criminal justice system in 2014.'
Proponents of "providing due-process-like
rights of participation" to alleged victims seek
to prevent "secondary harm, which comes from
governmental processes and governmental ac-
Lors within those processes." In the movement
to change victims' rights and roles in military
justice, all services established victims' legal
counsel programs, which provide legal advice
and advocacy for eligible victims of sexual as-
sault.
Congress' last wide-sweeping reforms
to victims' rights in the courts-martial process
were in the Fiscal Year 2016 and 2015 National
Defense Authorization Acts (NDAA).6 The 2015
NDAA amended Article 6b, Uniform Code of
2 The words "alleged victim" and "victim" in this
Article mean the named victim in a case that has yet
to be fully adjudicated. The word "alleged" is meant to
highlight the presumed innocence of the accused. The
word "petitioner" in this Article describes an alleged
victim who petitions for a writ of mandamus.
113 Pub. L. No. 291, § 535, 128 Stat. 3292 (2014) (cod-
ified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 806b) (2014 ed.) [herein-
after Article 6b].
Douglas E. Beloof, The Third Model of Criminal
Process: The Victim Particjpation Model, 1999 Utah L. Rev.
289, 293-96 (1999).
' See, e.g., Navy Victims' Legal Counsel Program,
http://www.jag.navy.mil/legal services/vlc.htm; Army
Special Victim Counsel Program, http://wiNv.army.mil/
standto/archive 2013-12-02/; Air Force Special Victims'
Counsel Program, http://wwwafjag.af.mil/sexualassault-
prosecution/index.asp.
' NDAA for Fiscal Year 2015, 113 Pub. L. No. 291, 128
Stat. 3292 (2014) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of title 18 of the United States Code); NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2016, 114 S. 1356 (2015) (codified as amend-
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Military Justice (UCMJ),' to give alleged vic-
tims,8 as nonparties to courts-martial, standing
to petition military Courts of Criminal Appeals
(CCA) for writs of mandamus.9 Mandamus is "[a]
command by order or writ" from a superior
court that is "directed to some inferior court
... requiring the performance of a particular
duty therein specified."o Under the 2015 Arti-
cle 6b(e), petitioners could only request writs of
mandamus if they believed their rights afford-
ed by Military Rules of Evidence 41211 or 51312
were violated by a military's judge's ruling. The
2015 Article 6b(e) read as follows:
(e) Enforcement By Court of Criminal
Appeals. - -
(1) If the victim of an offense under this
chapter believes that a court-martial
ruling violates the victim's rights
afforded by a Military Rule of Ev-
idence specified in paragraph (2),
the victim may petition the Court of
Criminal Appeals for a writ of man-
ed in scattered sections of title 18 of the United States
Code).
See generally Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM), Unit-
ed States (2012 ed.) [hereinafter MCM].
' 113 Pub. L. No. 291, § 535, 128 Stat. 3292 (2014)
(codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 806b(b)) (defining a
victim as "an individual who has suffered direct phys-
ical, emotional, or pecuniary harm as a result of the
commission of an offense" under the UCMJ). .
' Id at subsection (e).
10 Ballentine's Law Dictionary 770 (3d ed. 1969).
MCM (2012 ed. & Supp. 2015) (Mil. R. Evid. 41 2 (a)
provides that "[e]vidence offered to prove that any
alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior" or "[e]
vidence offered to prove any alleged victim's sexual pre-
disposition" is generally inadmissible "in any proceed-
ing involving an alleged sexual offense.").
12 Mil. R. Evid. 513(a) (providing: "A patient has a
privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other
person from disclosing a confidential conuunication
made between the patient and a psychotherapist ... in
a case arising under the UCMJ, if such communication
was made for the purpose of facilitating diagnosis or
treatment of the patient's mental or emotional condi-
tion.").
damus to require the court-martial
to comply with the Military Rule of
Evidence.
(2) Paragraph (1) applies with respect
to the protections afforded by the
following:
(A) Military Rule of Evidence 513,
relating to the psychothera-
pist-patient privilege.
(B) Military Rule of Evidence 412,
relating to the admission of evi-
dence regarding a victim's sexual
background.
In the 2016 NDAA, Article 6b(e)13 was
expanded to extend to the protections afford-
ed by Article 6b(a), the rights of a victim of an
offense, and additional Military Rules of Evi-
dence:
(e) Enforcement By Court of Criminal
Appeals. - -
(1) If the victim of an offense under this
chapter believes that a preliminary
hearing ruling under Section 832 of
this title (article 32) or a court-mar-
tial ruling violates the rights of the
victim afforded by a section (article)
or rule specified in paragraph (4),
the victim may petition the Court of
Criminal Appeals for a writ of man-
damus to require the preliminary
hearing officer or the court-martial
to comply with the section (article)
or rule.
(2) If the victim of an offense under
this chapter is subject to an order
s MCM (2016 ed.) (available at http://jsc.defense.gov/
Portals/99/Documents/UCMJAsOfFY16NDAA.pdf).
36 Washington College of Law
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to submit to a deposition, not-
withstanding the availability of the
victim to testify at the court-martial
trying the accused for the offense,
the victim may petition the Court of
Criminal Appeals for a writ of man-
damus to quash such order.
(3) A petition for a writ of mandamus
described in this subsection shall be
forwarded directly to the Court of
Criminal Appeals, by such means as
may be prescribed by the President,
and, to the extent practicable, shall
have priority over all other proceed-
ings before the court.
(4) Paragraph (1) applies with respect
to the protections afforded by the
following:
(A) This section (article).
(B) Section 832 (article 32) of this
title.
(C) Military Rule of Evidence 412,
relating to the admission of evi-
dence regarding a victim's sexual
background.
(D) Military Rule of Evidence 513,
relating to the psychothera-
pist-patient privilege.
(E) Military Rule of Evidence 514,
relating to the victim advo-
cate-victim privilege.
(F) Military Rule of Evidence 615,
relating to the exclusion of wit-
nesses.
Article 6b is now similar to the CVRA, which
allows the victim to petition for a writ of man-
damus if any of his or her rights enumerated
under the CVRA are violated."
However, Article 6b(e) has created sev-
eral questions of interpretation for judges and
practitioners. Particularly, it is not clear wheth-
er a CCA has jurisdiction over all claims con-
cerning Mil. R. Evid. 412, 513, 514," and 615.
It is also unclear whether victims can petition
for writs on substantive issues regarding a mili-
tary judge's ruling or only for violations of their
procedural rights. Finally, the text of Article
6b(e) does not state whether the alleged victim
is entitled to a writ of mandamus for any issues
outside of those enumerated in the article if the
CCA finds the alleged victim is a holder of a
separate right or privilege.
This Article interprets the meaning and
effect of Article 6b by analyzing the text of the
article and case precedents concerning the
CVRA. Part II reviews a CCA's jurisdiction to
hear victims' writs under the All Writs Act and
Article 6b. Part III analyzes the question of vic-
tims' standing to petition for writs of mandamus
and ultimately argues that Article 6b provides
the alleged victim with only limited standing
to request a writ. Part IV discusses the stan-
dard of review for a writ of mandamus and when
writs of mandamus are appropriately issued to
an alleged victim-petitioner. Part V addresses
false complaints of sexual assault and how they
can impact petitions requesting mandamus and
defense responses to those petitions. Practi-
tioners should understand these issues to best
analyze petitions for and oppositions to manda-
mus under Article 6b.
4 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a), (d)(3).
" See Exec. Order No. 13,696, 80 Fed. Reg. 35,820 (June
22, 2015) (amending MI. R. Evid. 514 to include a privi-
lege between a victim and Department of Defense Safe
Helpline staff and provided the victim with procedural
rights similar to those under Mil. R. Evid. 513).
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II. JURISDICTION & THE ALL WRITS ACT
Whether a court has jurisdiction is a
question of law that is reviewed de no'o.16 CCAs
may review a trial military judge's ruling under
three circumstances: (1) review in the ordinary
course of appellate review under Article 66,
UCMJ; (2) interlocutory appeal by the govern-
ment under Article 62, UCMJ;o and (3) petition
of extraordinary relief by "a person with stand-
ing to challenge the ruling."
The court-martial and CCAs' "constitutional
origin is based on the congressional authority
to govern the armed forces set out in Article
I, § 8, clause 14."11 "[A]ll courts established by
Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary
or appropriate in aid of their respective juris-
dictions and agreeable to the usages and prin-
ciples of law." 20 "'[M]ilitary courts [of appeals],
like Article III tribunals, are empowered to
issue extraordinary writs under the All Writs
Act.'"2 1 The All Writs Act neither serves as "an
16 United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 261 (C.A.A.E 2012)
(citations omitted).
17 18 U.S.C. § 862, Art. 62 (2015) (The government can
challenge an order or ruling of the military judge that:
(A) "terminates the proceedings with respect to a charge
or specification;" (B) "excludes evidence that is sub-
stantial proof of a fact material in the proceeding;" (C)
"directs the disclosure of classified information;" or (D)
"imposes sanctions for nondisclosure of classified infor-
mation." The government may also file an interlocutory
appeal when the military judge refuses to : (E) "issue a
protective order sought by the United States to prevent
the disclosure of classified information;" or (F) enforce
a protective order for classified information "that has
previously been issued by appropriate authority.").
18 See LRMev. Kastenberg, 72 M.J. 364, 376 (C.A.A.E
2013) (citations and internal punctuation omitted)
(Stucky, J. dissent).
19 United States v. Weiss, 36 M.J. 224, 228 (C.M.A. 1992).
20 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1949) [hereinafter "All Writs
Act"]; see also United States v. Denedo, 556 U.S. 904, 911
(2009); Rule for Courts-Martial 1203(b), MCM (2012 ed.),
Discussion.
21 Kastenberg, 72 M.J. at 367 (quotingDenedo, 556 U.S.
at 911).
independent grant of jurisdiction, nor does it
expand a [CCA]'s existing statutory jurisdic-
tion."2 "Rather, the All Writs Act requires two
determinations: (1) whether the requested writ
is 'in aid of' the [CCA]'s existing jurisdiction;
and (2) whether the requested writ is 'necessary
or appropriate.'" 2 3
"'The traditional use of the writ in aid of
appellate jurisdiction both at common law and
in the federal courts has been to confine an in-
ferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed
jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its au-
thority when it is its duty to do so.'"24 In the
context of military justice, "in aid of" includes
cases where a petitioner seeks "'to modify an
action that was taken within the subject matter
jurisdiction of the military justice system.'"25
"To establish subject-matter jurisdiction, the
harm alleged [by the petitioner] must have had
the potential to directly affect the findings and
sentence" of the court-martial.2 1 "A writ petition
may be 'in aid of' a [CCA]'s jurisdiction even on
interlocutory matters where no finding or sen-
tence has been entered in the court-martial."27
It is clear that CCAs have jurisdiction
under the All Writs Act to hear victims' peti-
tions for writs of mandamus concerning Mil. R.
Evid. 412, 513, 514, and 615 rulings and rulings
22 Id (citing Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529, 534-35
(1999)).
23 Id. (quoting Denedo v. United States, 66 M.J. 114, 119
(C.A.A.E 2008), aff'd, 556 U.S. 904 (2009)).
21 United States v. Booker, 72 M.J. 787, 791 (N-M. Ct.
Crim. App. 2013) (quoting Roche v. Evaporated Milk
Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943)).
- Kastenberg, 72 M.J. at 367 (quoting Denedo, 66 M.J. at
120).
26 Id. (citations omitted).
27 Id.; see alo Roche, 319 U.S. at 25 (stating appellate
court authority to issue writs of mandamus "is not
confined to the issuance of writs in aid of jurisdiction
already acquired by appeal but extends to [cases within]
its appellate jurisdiction although no appeal has been
perfected.").
38 Washington College of Law
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regarding a victims' rights under Article 6b(a)
and (c) and Article 32 (preliminary hearings).
An alleged victim's request that a CCA reverse
the military judge's ruling on those matters is
an effort "'to modify an action. that was taken
within the subject matter jurisdiction of the
military justice system.'"28 The Court of Ap-
peals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) and CCAs
regularly review military judges' rulings under
those rules of evidence and those articles. 29
Furthermore, a military judge's ruling on those
matters, such as the admissibility of evidence
of a previous sexual relationship between the
accused and the alleged victim (Mil. 11. Evid.
412), or psychological evidence that the alleged
victim has a personality disorder (Mil. R. Evid.
513), "has a direct bearing on . . . the evidence
considered by the court-martial on the issues
of guilt or innocence -- which will form the
very foundation of a finding and sentence." 0
As such, the harm from an improper ruling
on such evidence would have "the potential to
directly affect the findings and sentence" of a
court-martial."
However, the Army Court of Criminal
Appeals recently found that they did not need
to consider whether a matter was in aid of their
jurisdiction under the All Writs Act if the peti-
28 Kastenberg, 72 M.J. at 368.
29 See, e.g., United States v. Gaddis, 70 M.J. 248, 250
(C.A.A.E 2011) (addressing the Mil. R. Evid. 412 balanc-
ing test); United States v. Key, 71 M.J. 566, 569 (N-M. Ct.
Crim. App. 2012), review denied, No. 13-0018 NA, 2012
CAAF LEXIS 1189 (C.A.A.E Oct. 31, 2012) (analyzing
judge's Mil. R. Evid. 412 ruling); United States v. Klemick,
65 M.J. 576, 578 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2006) (reviewing
military judge's Mil. R. Evid. 513 ruling); United States
v. Brown, 17 M.J. 544, 546 (A.C.M.R. 1983) (holding that
disallowing evidence offered under Mil. R. Evid. 412 by
the defense was erroneous).
30 Kastenberg, 72 M.J. at 368.
31 Id. (quoting Ctr. for Constitutional Rights v. United
States, 72 M.J. 126, 129 (C.A.A.E 2013)).
tion is filed for one of the enumerated reasons
under Article 6b(e).3 2
III. STANDING
After an appellate court reviews wheth-
er it has jurisdiction, the next question con-
cerns whether the petitioner has standing.
"As 'an essential and unchanging part of the
case -or- controversy requirement of Article
III,' constitutional standing 'is a threshold is-
sue in every case before a federal court, deter-
mining the power of the court to entertain the
suit.'"3 Military courts, Article I courts, gener-
ally apply standing requirements "as a pruden-
tial matter."3 4 Thus, an alleged victim's failure to
satisfy standing requirements would preclude
a court's consideration of his or her petition for
mandamus relief.
Thhave standing, a petitioner must estab-
lish an injury in fact, causation, and redress-
ability.35 An injury in fact is "a concrete and
particularized invasion of a legally protected
32 DR v. Lippert, No. 20150769, 2016 CCA LEXIS 63, at
*5 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 1, 2016).
* United States v. McVeigh, 106 E3d 325, 334 (10th Cir.
1997) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildife, 504 U.S.
555, 560 (1992); Boyle v. Anderson, 68 F.3d 1093, 1100 (8th
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1266 (1996)) (internal
citations omitted).
" United States v. Wuterich, 67 M.J. 63, 69 (C.A.A.E
2008) (citing United States v. Chisholn, 59 M.J. 151, 152
(C.A.A.E 2003)) ("This Court, which was established
under Article I of the Constitution, has applied the
principles from the 'cases' and 'controversies' limitation
as a prudential matter."); see, e.g., United States v. Loving,
41 M.J. 213,244 (C.A.A.E 1994) (assuming arguendo that
appellant would have had standing to object to search
of another's home); see also Kastenberg, 72 M.J. at 368-69
(addressing whether petitioner-victim had standing by
using federal precedent); United States v. Disney, 62 M.J.
46, 48-49 (C.A.A.E 2005) (finding the appellant had
standing to assert claim).
3 Wuterich, 67 M.J. at 69.
Washington College of Law 39Spring 201.6
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interest.""' Causation is a "traceable connection
between the alleged injury in fact and the al-
leged conduct of the [respondent]."" Redress-
ability is shown when "it is likely . . . that the
[petitioner's] injury will be remedied by the re-
lief [petitioner] seeks in bringing suit."3 8
In the United States' current system of pub-
lic prosecutions, "federal courts have frequently
permitted third parties to assert their interests
in preventing disclosure of material sought in
criminal proceedings or in preventing further
access to materials already so disclosed." 9 For
example, some courts have found that third
parties have standing to assert a recognized
privilege, such as the attorney-client privilege,
or a claim that they have been wronged by
the actions of the defendant.40 In United States
v. Nixon, the Supreme Court decided a case
where the President asserted his Presidential
privilege as a third party against a subpoena du-
ces tecum filed by the Special Prosecutor in a
criminal case.41 The Fifth Circuit has found a
third party has standing to request redaction of
a criminal record that has impugned his repu-
tation.42 Other courts have held that the press
" Sprint Communs. Co.. v. APCCSeros., 554 U.S. 269, 274
(2008) (quotingLujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61).
:7 Id
38 Id
" Kastenberg, 72 MJ. at 369 (citing United States e. Hub-
bard, 650 E2d 293, 311 n.67 (D.C. Cir. 1980))..
40 Anthony v. United States, 667 E2d 870, 878 (10th Cir.
1981) (holding that a third-party psychologist, who was
the victim of illegal wiretapping, had standing to object
to appellant-wNiretapper's request for discovery and had
standing to bring motion to suppress the contents of
the un lawfully recorded tapes).
1 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 686-88, 715-16
(1974).
11 In re Smith, 656 F.2d 1101, 1107 (5th Cir. 1981)
(holding the liberty and property concepts of the Fifth
Amendment protect an individual from being publicly
and officially accused of having committed a serious
crime, particularly where the accusations gain wide no-
toriety) (citing United States v. Briggs, 514 F.2d 794, 799
(5th Cir. 1975)).
has standing to intervene in criminal cases to
challenge the abridgment of free speech.4
However, those cases deviate from the
norm in criminal proceedings: "a citizen [gen-
erally] lacks standing to contest the policies of
the prosecuting authority when he himself is
neither prosecuted nor threatened with prose-
cution." Courts that deny standing to alleged
victims in criminal trials often do so because
there was no injury in fact:
The direct, distinct and palpable
injury in a criminal sentencing
proceeding plainly falls only on
the defendant who is being sen-
tenced. It is the defendant and
he alone that suffers the direct
consequences of a criminal con-
viction and sentence. Collateral
individuals to the proceeding . .
. have not suffered an Article III
direct injury sufficient to invoke a
federal court's jurisdiction to rule
on their claim. 5
Military courts should be wary of ex-
tending standing in contravention of a clear
mandate by Congress. In a criminal trial, the
accused risks losing the very foundation of
what the United States Constitution was creat-
ed to protect: freedom and liberty.
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 478 U.S. 1, 15
(1986) (holding there is a First Amendment right of
access to criminal proceedings); In re Subpoena to Testify
Before Grand Jury Directed to Custodian ofRecords, 864
E2d 1559, 1.561 (11th Cir. 1989) (citing In re Application
ofDow Jones & Co., 842 E2d 603, 607 (2d Cir. 1988)
("The rights of potential recipients of speech, like the
news agencies, to challenge the abridgment of that
speech has already been decided.")).
Linda R 5. S. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973).
United States v. Grundhoefer, 916 F.2d 788, 791 (2d Cir.
1990).
40 Washington College of Law Spring 201.6
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"The Bill of Rights was written to
protect the individual from the
overreaching and intrusive power
of the government when it seeks
to deprive the individual of life,
liberty or property. Preventing
the encroachment of government
into a person's rights, not actually
requiring state action to protect
these rights, is the philosophical
underpinning of our democracy.""
Upholding the accused's constitution-
al rights also comports with the first purpose
of military law "to promote justice." Finally,
a non-party's limited right to appeal a military
judge's ruling is consistent with an accused's
constitutional rights to due process and a
speedy trial."
Extraordinary writs slow down trials
while the parties await an appellate decision.
Thus, the military justice system, and even
more so the judiciary, should stand as a bul-
wark against the encroachment of the accused's
constitutional rights.
Although "[t]here is long-standing prec-
edent that a holder of a privilege has a right to
6 Racbel King, Why a Victims'Rights Constitutional
Amendment I a Bad Idea: Practical Experiences from
Crime Victims, 68 U. Cin. L. Rev. 357, 366-67 (2000); see
also id. at 368 ("[Bills of] rights were supposed to guard
against the tyranny of autocrats and kings. Abuse of
power by Federalist judges only strengthened the ideas
that underlay the Bill of Rights. Criminal procedure, on
paper, gave a whole battery of protections to persons
accused of [sic] crime. The defendant had the right to
appeal a conviction; the state had no right to appeal an
acquittal.") (quoting
L-ence M. Friedman, A History of American Law 150 (2d
ed. 1985)).
0 UCMJ, Part I.
* See Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 96 (1967) (citing
DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121,126 (1962)).
contest and protect the privilege," 9 Congress
specifically granted standing to alleged victims
under Article 6b for alleged violations of their
procedural rights under Article 6b, Article 32,
and specific Military Rules of Evidence. (cite)
"Where the appeal statutes establish the con-
ditions of appellate review, an appellate court
cannot rightly exercise its discretion to issue a
writ whose only effect would be to avoid those
conditions and thwart the Congressional policy
against piecemeal appeals in criminal cases."50
Accordingly, Article 6b provides the alleged
victim with limited standing to file a writ of
mandamus only on those issues specified under
the article." CCAs should not extend standing
to alleged victims on any matters not explicitly
granted by Congress.
A. Standing for Alleged Victims
Prior to the CVRA
"[P]rior to the CVRA most courts denied
crime victims any opportunity to challenge
lower court decisions impairing their rights as
victims, whether through mandamus or other-
wise." 52 In United States v. McVeigh, the Tenth
Circuit dismissed the victims' mandamus peti-
tion for lack of standing when they appealed
a district court order prohibiting the victims
from attending trial.53 That court held the vic-
tims did not have a personal First Amendment
right to attend the trial.54 Both before and even
* Kastenberg, 72 M.J. at 368 (citations omitted).
50 Roche, 319 U.S. at 30 (citation omitted).
t See Kastenberg, 72 M.J. at 368.
52 United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 534 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (citations omitted).
* McVeigh, 106 E3d at 336.
Id. at 335 (finding "recognition of such an enti-
tlement, arguably affording a constitutional basis for
disruptive interlocutory review in every criminal prose-
cution at the behest of any disappointed would-be trial
attendee, would entail an unprecedented expansion/
transformation of the public trial-access right unwar-
ranted by the policies cited by the Supreme Court
Washington College of Law 41Spring 2016
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after the CVRA, several courts have found vic-
tims do not have standing to appeal a criminal
restitution order."5 However, at least one court
found it could hear a petition from an alleged
victim concerning Federal Rule of Evidence
412, which is substantially similar to Mil. R.
Evid. 412,66 concerning the admissibility of the
as the rationale for gleaning the right from the First
Amendment").
" United States v. Mindel, 80 E3d 394, 398 (9th Cir.
1996) (dismissing victim's appeal of criminal restitution
order and related mandamus petition for lack of stand-
ing); see also United States v. Aguirre- Gonzdlez, 597 E3d
46, 54 (1st Cir. 2010) ("[T]he default rule [is] that crime
victims have no right to directly appeal a defendant's
criminal sentence, under the CVRA or otherwise.");
United States v. Kelley, 997 E2d 806, 807 (10th Cir. 1993)
(finding victim has no standing under the Victim and
Witness Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 3663, Pub. L. No. 97-
291, § 5(a), 96 Stat. 1253 (1984) (as amended by Pub. L.
No. 110-326, § 202, 122 Stat. 3561 (September 26, 2008)),
to appeal a court's criminal restitution order); Unit-
edStates v. Johnson, 983 E2d 216, 221 (11th Cir. 1993);
Grundhoefer, 916 E2d at 791-792.
56 Federal Rules of Evidence 412 provides:
() Prohibited Uses. The following evidence is not admis-
sible in a civil or criminal proceeding involving alleged
sexual misconduct:
) evidence offered to prove that a victim
engaged in other sexual behavior; or
(2) evidence offered to prove a victim's sexual
predisposition.
M Exceptions.
M Criminal Cases. The court may admit the
following evidence in a criminal case:
(A) evidence of specific instances of a victim's sexual
behavior, if offered to prove that someone other than
the defendant was the source of semen, injury, or other
physical evidence;
(B) evidence of specific instances of a victim's sexual
behavior with respect to the person accused of the
sexual misconduct, if offered by the defendant to prove
consent or if offered by the prosecutor; and
(c) evidence whose exclusion would violate
the defendant's constitutional rights.
alleged victim's other sexual behavior." In Doe,
the Fourth Circuit found the district court's or-
der on such an issue met the test of "practical
finality" but never squarely addressed whether
the victim had standing.58
B. Rights under the CVRA and
Article 6b, UCMJ
A comparison of the CVRA with Article
6b is instructive in understanding Article 6b's
limitations on standing. The CVRA provides
victims, their lawful representatives, and gov-
ernment attorneys standing to petition for a
writ of mandamus to assert the following vic-
tims' rights:
(1) The right to be reasonably protected
from the accused. (2) The right to rea-
sonable, accurate, and timely notice of
any public court proceeding, or any
parole proceeding, involving the crime
or of any release or escape of the ac-
cused. (3) The right not to be excluded
from any such public court proceeding,
unless the court, after receiving clear
and convincing evidence, determines
that testimony by the victim would be
materially altered if the victim heard
other testimony at that proceeding. (4)
The right to be reasonably heard at any
public proceeding in the district court
involving release, plea, sentencing, or
any parole proceeding. (5) The reason-
able right to confer with the attorney
for the Government in the case. (6) The
right to full and timely restitution as
provided in law. (7) The right to pro-
ceedings free from unreasonable delay.
(8) The right to be treated with fairness
* Doe v. United States, 666 F.2d 43, 45 (4th Cir. 1981).
58 Id. at 46.
42 Washington College of Law Spring 2016
8
Criminal Law Practitioner, Vol. 3 [2015], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol3/iss2/3
Criminal Law Practitioner
and with respect for the victim's dignity
and privacy.5 9
Under Article 6b(a), the victim has sub-
stantially similar rights:
(1) The right to be reasonably protected
from the accused.
(2) The right to reasonable, accurate, and
timely notice of any of the following:
(A) A public hearing concerning the
continuation of confinement prior
to trial of the accused.
(B) A preliminary hearing ... relating to
the offense.
(C) A court-martial relating to the of-
fense.
(D) A public proceeding of the service
clemency and parole board relating
to the offense.
(E) The release or escape of the ac-
cused, unless such notice may en-
danger the safety of any person.
(3) The right not to be excluded from any
public hearing or proceeding described
in paragraph (2) unless the military
judge or investigating officer, as appli-
cable, after receiving clear and convinc-
ing evidence, determines that testimony
by the victim of an offense under this
chapter would be materially altered if
the victim heard other testimony at that
hearing or proceeding.
(4) The right to be reasonably heard at any
of the following:
5 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a), (d)(1) (2015).
(A) A public hearing concerning the
continuation of confinement prior
to trial of the accused.
(B) A sentencing hearing relating to the
offense.
(C) A public proceeding of the service
clemency and parole board relating
to the offense.
(5) The reasonable right to confer with the
counsel representing the Government
at any proceeding described in para-
graph (2).
(6) The right to receive restitution as pro-
vided in law.
(7) The right to proceedings free from un-
reasonable delay.
(8) The right to be treated with fairness
and with respect for the dignity and
privacy of the victim of an offense un-
der ... [the UCMJ].
Significantly, both Article 6b(e) and the
CVRA primarily focus on the procedural rights
of victims, such as their rights to be present
and heard..
C. Rights v. Protections under
Article 6b, UCMJ
To understand whether Article 6b grants
standing to petition for substantive verses pro-
cedural rights under Mil. R. Evid. 412, the prac-
titioner must analyze the meaning of the word
"rights" under Article 6b(e)(1) as compared
to the word "protections" under Article 6b(e)
(4), as the terms are not interchangeable. The
subsections are contradictory. Article 6b(e)(1)
states that an alleged victim may file a writ if
he or she "believes that a court-martial ruling
violates the rights of the victim afforded by a
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section (article) or rule specified in paragraph
(4)"; whereas, Article 6b(e)(4) states that 6b(e)
(1) "applies with respect to the protections af-
forded by" those articles and rules.6 0 A right is
defined as "[a] power, privilege, or immunity se-
cured to a person by law." 6 1 A substantive right
is "[a] right that can be protected or enforced
by law; a right of substance rather than form."6 2
For example, psychotherapist-patient, victim
advocate -victim, or attorney-client privilege
are substantive rights. A procedural right is a
right that derives from legal or administrative
procedure" and can also be used to "help[] in
the protection or enforcement of a substantive
right."6 ' For example, a procedural right is the
right to notice or to be heard at a proceeding.
However, the word "protection," the "state of
being protected," is much broader and denotes
being "shield[ed] from injury or destruction."4
Mil. R. Evid. 513 clearly grants a victim
the substantive right, and the protection, of
confidential, privileged communications with
a psychotherapist, and the procedural right to
assert the psychotherapist-patient privilege.
Because of this dual grant, the alleged victim
has the ability to petition both substantive and
procedural aspects of a judge's Mil. R. Evid. 513
rulings. Therefore, this section primarily ad-
dresses a victim's rights vs. protections under
Mil. R. Evid. 412.
' Mil. R. Evid. 412 (emphasis added); Mil. R. Evid. 513
(emphasis added).
61 Black's Law Dictionary 1322 (7th ed. 1999).
62 Id. at 1324.
63 Id. at 1323.
* Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 926 (1975).
61 Mil. R. Evid. 513(e) (On 17 June 2015, the President
signed Exec. Order No. 13,696, 80 C.ER. 119 (Jun. 22,
2015), implementing significant changes to the MCM,
including Mil. R. Evid. 513 and 514. Mil. R. Evid. 513(e)
now provides the patient the procedural rights to notice
of the evidence, a "reasonable opportunity to attend the
[closed] hearing and be heard," and the opportunity to
call witnesses and present evidence).
Defense practitioners may aver the rights
afforded to an alleged victim under Mil. R.
Evid. 412 only include the procedural rights to
notice of any Mil. R. Evid. 412 motion; to attend
the hearing; and to a reasonable opportunity to
be heard and provide argument at the hearing
before a military judge determines whether the
evidence is admissible.66 If the alleged victim
was afforded these rights and does not claim
they were violated, the accused could claim
the alleged victim lacked standing to petition
a CCA for a writ of mandamus under Article 6b.
On the other hand, the alleged victim
could claim that the rights afforded under Mil.
R. Evid. 412 extend to challenging the military
judge's substantive evidentiary rulings if they
fail to comply with that rule. For example, the
alleged victim may argue the military judge
erred by admitting evidence that was not cov-
ered by one of the exceptions under Mil. R.
Evid. 412. Such a writ of mandamus would then
"appl[y] to the protections afforded by" Mil. R.
Evid. 412.67 To determine whether Article 6b
applies to the "rights" or "protections" of Mil.
R. Evid. 412, would-be petitioners would turn
to the intent of the rule.
Mil. R. Evid. 412 was intended to "safe-
guard the alleged victim against the invasion of
privacy and potential embarrassment that is as-
sociated with public disclosure of intimate sex-
ual details and the infusion of sexual innuendo
into the fact-finding process. . . . By affording
victims protection in most instances, the rule
encourages victims of sexual misconduct to
66 See E-mail from David W Warning, Appellate De-
fense Counsel, Navy-Marine Corps Appellate Review
Activity, to Leila Mullican (May 28, 2015, 15:49:36 EST)
(on file with author); see also Mil. R. Evid. 412 (requiring
the hearing to be closed and the record of the hearing
sealed but not stating whether those are enforceable
procedural rights of the alleged victim).
6 UCMJ, Article 6b(e).
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institute and to participate in legal proceed-
ings against alleged offenders."" Further, Mil.
R. Evid. 412 was intended to protect victims of
sexual offenses from the degrading and embar-
rassing disclosure of intimate details of their
private lives while preserving the constitution-
al rights of the accused to present a defense."
Guarding the alleged victim's privacy
is clearly one of the "protections" afforded by
Mil. R. Evid. 412. The alleged victim-petition-
er would argue nothing from legislative his-
tory supports that Congress intended to limit
the rights under Mil. R. Evid. 412 to the pro-
cedural rights of notice and an opportunity to
appear and be heard. They would support that
reasoning by also claiming that the military
judge's substantive ruling violated their "right
to be treated with fairness and with respect for
the[ir] dignity and privacy" under Article 6b(a)
(8). A reading that mandamus can only be grant-
ed for procedural violations of Mil. R. Evid. 412
could deprive an alleged victim of a remedy
even when a military judge's ruling depriving
68 United States v. Banker, 60 M.J. 216, 219 (C.A.A.E
2004) (citations omitted).
"' See United States v. Ellerbrock, 70 M.J. 314, 322
(C.A.A.E 2011) ("M.R.E. 412 is a rape shield law. It is
intended to protect the privacy of victims of sexual
assault while at the same time protecting the constitu-
tional right of an accused to a fair trial through his right
to put on a defense."); United States v. Sanchez, 44 M.J.
174, 177-78 (C.A.A.E 1996) (finding Mil. R. Evid. 412
is "designed to protect a victim's privacy and thereby
protect them from further trauma"); United States v. Fox,
24 M.J. 110, 112 (C.M.A. 1987) (finding purpose of Mil.
R. Evid. 412 is to "protect victims of nonconsensual
sexual offenses against needless embarrassment and
unwarranted invasions of privacy"); MCM, App. 22, at
A22-36 ("Rule 412 is intended to shield victims of sexu-
al assaults from the often embarrassing and degrading
cross-examination and evidence presentations common
in prosecutions of such offenses .".. The purpose of
[the 1998 amendment] is to safeguard the alleged victim
against the invasion of privacy and potential embarrass-
ment that is associated with public disclosure of inti-
mate sexual details and the infusion of sexual innuendo
into the fact-finding process.").
the alleged victim of privacy amounted to a
clear deviation from established law or prece-
dent. Such a result could frustrate the intent of
Congress.o
However, since the alleged victim in
a criminal trial does not have constitutional
rights equivalent to those of the accused in the
trial, the text of the statute granting the victim's
right to appeal prevails. But the rights and the
protections afforded to the alleged victim un-
der Mil. R. Evid. 412 differ, making Article 6b's
use of those two words in different subsections
contradictory. Although Mil. R. Evid. 412 pro-
vides the victim with protection from improper
disclosure of his or her sexual history and pre-
disposition, the text of the rule does not endow
the alleged victim with any substantive right
to privacy, as Mil. R. Evid. 513 or 514 do with
privilege." Rather, the alleged victim is provid-
ed the following procedural rights: the right to
notice of a motion seeking to admit evidence of
the victim's sexual behavior under Mil. R. Evid.
412(c)(1)(B) and the right to "be afforded a rea-
sonable opportunity to attend and be heard"
under Mil. R. Evid. 412(c)(2). Therefore, a plain
reading of the statute reveals that alleged vic-
tims can only petition CCAs for writs of man-
damus if their procedural rights under Mil. R.
Evid. 412 are violated.
Courts should also deny victims' peti-
tions claiming that a military judge violated an
alleged "right to privacy" under Article 6b(a)
(8) in a Mil. R. Evid. 412 ruling. Article 6b(a)
'0 See Doe, 666 F2d at 46 ("[T~he congressional intent
embodied in rule [Federal Rules of Evidence] 412 will
be frustrated if rape victims are not allowed to appeal
an erroneous evidentiary ruling made at a pre-trial
hearing conducted pursuant to the rule.").
Mil. R. Evid. 513 (clearly providing a substantive
right to confidential communications between the al-
leged victim and a psychotherapist because "[a] patient
has a privilege to refuse to disclose" such communica-
tions).
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(8)'s "right to be treated with fairness and with
respect for . . . dignity and privacy" does not
guarantee a victim a substantive right to priva-
cy. Rather, it guarantees a procedural right to
be treated with fairness and respect. In a crim-
inal proceeding, the victim's privacy interest
takes a back seat to the government's interest
in prosecuting the case and the accused's con-
stitutional rights. (cite). Therefore, if the trial
judge adequately follows the procedures out-
lined in Mil. R. Evid. 412, the judge has com-
plied with Article 6b(a)(8) by treating the victim
with fairness and respect for the victim's priva-
cy, and the victim should have no right to a writ
of mandamus attacking the substantive ruling.7 2
Even if no plain meaning can be ascertained
from the statute, established cannons of inter-
pretation also promote such a result. Under
the general/specific cannon of interpretation,"
the broader word "protection" under Article
6b(e)(2) should be limited by the more specific
word "rights" in Article 6b(e)(1). The legislative
history of the 2015 version of Article 6b states
subsection (e) authorizes a victim "who believes
that a court-martial ruling violates the victim's
rights afforded by" Mil. R. Evid. 412 and 513
"to petition the Court of Criminal Appeals for a
1 See United States v. BP Prods. N Am. Inc., No. H-07-
434, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12893, at *50 (S.D. Tex. Feb.
21, 2008) ("The reasonable right to confer with the
government and the government's obligation to use its
best efforts to provide notice of this right are . . . mech-
anisms through which the CVRA guarantees victims'
right to fairness").
" Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:
The Interpretation of Legal Texts 183 (2012) ("If there
is a conflict between a general provision and a specific
provision, the specific provision prevails.");RadLAX
Gateway Hotel, LLC v. AmalgamatedBank, 132 S. Ct.
2065, 2071 (2012) (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535,
550-51 (1974)) ("The general/specific canon is perhaps
most frequently applied to statutes in which a general
permission or prohibition is contradicted by a specific
prohibition or permission. To eliminate the contradic-
tion, the specific provision is construed as an exception
to the general one.").
writ of mandamus to require the court-martial
to comply with the MRE."" Therefore, under
this rubric, the alleged victim would only have
standing to petition for a writ of mandamus to
assert his or her stated procedural rights under
Mil. R. Evid. 412; the alleged victim would not
have standing to assert a substantive right of
privacy.
Under the nearest reasonable referent
cannon,"' Article 6b(e)(1)'s phrase, "violates
the rights of the victim afforded by" one of the
enumerated articles or rules, means only those
rights provided by the specified article or rule
of evidence are applicable.
This reading of Article 6b(e) is consis-
tent with the CAAF's decision in Kastenberg,
which held the alleged victim had standing to
assert her right to be heard but the military
judge retained appropriate discretion to deter-
mine "the manner in which her argument [wa]
s presented." 6 As stated by CAAF, "M.R.E. 412
and 513 do not create ... any right to appeal an
adverse evidentiary ruling."" Article 6b(e) may
be Congress' sanction of Kastenberg's decision
that a petitioner has standing to request a writ
when his or her procedural rights have been
violated, and Kastenberg should not be read to
further expand the alleged victim's standing to
substantive issues. 78
113 Cong. Rec. H8684 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 2014).
See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:
The Interpretation of Legal Texts 152 (2012) ("When the
syntax involves something other than a parallel series
of nouns or verbs, a prepositive or postpositive modifier
normally applies only to the nearest reasonable refer-
ent."); see also United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Kelman Bottles,
538 Fed. Appx. 175, 180 (3d Cir. 2013) (applying the
nearest reasonable referent cannon).
16 72 M.J. at 371.
7 Id.
" E-mail from David W Warning, Appellate Defense
Counsel, Navy-Marine Corps Appellate Review Activity,
to Leila Mullican (May 28, 2015, 15:49:36 EST) (on file
with author). However, Congress seemingly did extend
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Article 6b(e)(4) limits standing to only
the protections afforded by Articles 6b and
32 and Mil. R. Evid. 412, 513, 514, and 615..
Therefore, many potential victims do not have
standing to file mandamus petitions under Ar-
ticle 6b(e) even though subsection (b) broadly
defines a victim to be anyone who "has suffered
direct physical, emotional, or pecuniary harm
as a result of the commission of an offense" un-
der the UCMJ. For example, under Article 6b(e),
a victim of an assault does not have standing
under Article 6b(e) to contest a military judge's
decision under Mil. R. Evid. 403, 404, or 405
even if the military judge errs in entering a
negative trait of the victim's character into ev-
idence. An assault victim does not have stand-
ing to petition a military judge's ruling admit-
ting evidence that the victim was the aggressor
under Mil. R. Evid. 404(a)(2). A victim, even a
victim of sexual assault, cannot petition a mili-
tary judge's ruling admitting evidence of his or
her bias under Mil. R. Evid. 608 or of his or her
former crime under Mil. R. Evid. 609. Although
such evidence could be just as harmful to the
privacy of the alleged victim of a sexual assault
as evidence that he or she had a certain sexu-
al relationship in the past or a discussion with
a psychotherapist, Congress did not include
those rules of evidence as grounds for manda-
mus petitions under Article 6b(e).
Congress also decided to leave out oth-
er provisions related to Mil. R. Evid. 412 and
513, such as Mil. R. Evid. 413 (similar crimes
in sexual offense cases) and 414 (similar crimes
in child-molestation cases), under the article's
grant of standing. Even though Mil. R. Evid.
413 and 414 cover other similar offenses of an
alleged accused, they could become relevant to
the alleged victim in a case of sexual assault if,
standing under Article 6b to substantive violations of
Mil. R. Evid. 513 and 514.
for example, the prosecution sought to admit
evidence of the alleged victim's past abuse by
the same accused under those rules. Although
Mil. R. Evid. 412 may also be implicated under
those circumstances, the alleged victim could
have a desire to keep such prior abuse private
or have a different perspective about the ad-
missibility of such evidence under Mil. R. Evid.
413 and 414 than the military judge or the pros-
ecutor.
D. Standing under the CVRA
Federal case law concerning the CVRA fo-
cuses on procedural, rather than substantive,
potential errors of the lower courts." This pro-
cedural focus highlights the petitioner's heavy
burden when petitioning for writs of manda-
mus on substantive issues and reflects how nar-
rowly courts have interpreted congressional
grants of standing to petition for mandamus
reliefso Several appellate cases decided under
the CVRA involve the right to be "reasonably
heard" at hearings and obtain evidence." Oth-
7 See notes 84-86 infra; cf In reKK, 756 E3d 1169,
1170 (9th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (deciding substantive
issue of whether district court abused its discretion in
denying victim's motion to squash subpoena requested
by defendant).
80 See also Lzppert, No. 20150769, 2016 CCA LEXIS 63,
at *33 (interpreting Article 6b and focusing on improper
procedure).
81 See, e.g., In re Siler, 571 E3d 604, 611 (6th Cir. 2009)
(finding no abuse of discretion in court's denial of
disclosure of presentence report (PSR) to victim); In
re Brock, 262 Fed. Appx. 510, 512 (4th Cir. 2008) (per
curiam) (finding no abuse of discretion in denying the
victim access to the PSR because victim could exercise
right to be heard without such access and no abuse of
discretion in refusing to consider victim's arguments
on sentencing guidelines because the court consid-
ered his statements regarding the assault); United States
v. Moussaoui, 483 E3d 220, 233-34, 238-39 (4th Cir.
2007) (reversing district court's order granting victims
access to all the government's information turned over
to defense counsel in discovery in the criminal case
for use in civil litigation);In reKenna , 453 E3d 1136,
1137 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (finding that CVRA
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er cases involve the victim's right to attend the
court hearing." At least one court has found
the victim's right to confer with the prosecutor
"on a proposed plea agreement and the gov-
ernment's obligation to provide notice of that
right is subject to the limit that the CVRA not
impair prosecutorial discretion.""
"Neither the text of the [CVIRA] nor its
legislative history provides guidance as to what
specific procedures or substantive relief, if any,
Congress intended [the provision concerning
the victim's right to be treated with fairness
and with respect for the victim's dignity and
privacy] to require or prohibit."" Some courts
have applied the right to fairness broadly, find-
ing that the right to fairness provision was "in-
tended to conform to the sponsors' expectation
that the statute will be applied liberally to the
extent consistent with other law."8 ' However,
even those courts have focused on the proce-
dural rights of crime victims and the fact that
the other protections afforded by the CVRA
did not confer a general right for victims to access the
PSR); United States 9. Ingrassia, No. CR-04-0455 (ADS),
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27817, at *50 (E.D.N.Y Sept. 7,
2005) (CVRA does not require disclosure of PSR or
"all discovery in a criminal case to promote the goal of
giving victims a voice at plea proceedings"); cf Kenna
v. United States Dist. Court for the CD. of Cal., 435 E3d
1011, 1018 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding district court erred
by limiting the victims to presenting written statements
at sentencing hearing).
82 See, e.g., In reMikhel, 453 E3d 1137, 1139 (9th Cir.
2006) (per curiam) ("A crime victim . . . does not have
an absolute right to witness a trial at the expense of the
defendant's rights," but the court must consider reason-
able alternatives to exclusion); United States v. L.M., 425
F Supp. 2d 948, 957 (N.D. Iowa 2006) (holding that the
deceased victim's family was granted the right to not be
excluded from any public court proceeding but could be
excluded from private hearings).
83 United States v. BPProds. NI Am. Inc., No. H-07-434,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12893, at *47 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 21,
2008).
84 United States v. Turner, 367 E Supp. 2d 319, 335
(E.D.N.Y. 2005).
85 Turner, 367 E Supp. 2d at 335.
are mechanisms to ensure the victim's right
to fairness is upheld." This provision has also
been used to protect the disclosure of victims'
private information to the general public."
E. Conclusion
The Constitution requires that CCAs
must strictly construe statutes providing stand-
ing to request a writ of mandamus. A compar-
ison between the CVRA and Article 6b, along
with a review of the plain reading of the stat-
utes and historical precedent, highlights Con-
gress' narrow grant of standing in Article 6b(e).
Although a petitioner has a privacy interest in
Mil. R. Evid. 412 evidence, that privacy interest
does not rise to the level of a right guaranteed
by Mil. R. Evid. 412. Petitioners should not be
86 BPProds. N Am. Inc., No. H-07-434, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12893, at *50; United States v. Heaton, 458 E
Supp. 2d 1271, 1272 (D. Utah 2006) ("When the gov-
ernment files a motion to dismiss criminal charges
that involve a specific victim, the only way to protect
the victim's right to be treated fairly and with respect
for her dignity is to consider the victim's views on the
dismissal."); Turner, 367 E Supp. 2d at 335 (mandating
that the government must provide the court with the
victims' names and contact information so the court
could ensure their rights are afforded them);
82 See United States v. Patkar, No. 06-00250 JMS, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6055, at *19-20 (D. Haw Jan. 28, 2008)
(finding fairness and respect for victim's privacy out-
weighed public interest in disclosure of sealed informa-
tion).
m See Will, 389 U.S. at 96 ("All our jurisprudence is
strongly colored by the notion that appellate review
should be postponed, except in certain narrowly de-
fined circumstances, until after final judgment has been
rendered by the trial court."); Carroll 9. United States,
354 U.S. 394, 415 (1957) ("Delays in the prosecution
of criminal cases are numerous and lengthy enough
without sanctioning appeals that are not plainly autho-
rized by statute."); see also Lippert, No. 20150769, 2016
CCA LEXIS 63, at *33 (declining to determine whether
Mil. R. Evid. 513 records were admissible at trial in
deciding victim's petition for writ of mandamus because
there had "not yet been a proceeding or determination
that correctly applies the procedural and suibstantive
requirements of Mil. R. Evid. 513 to the facts of this
case").
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granted standing to claim the military judge
clearly abused his or her discretion on substan-
tive matters. Only if a military judge does not
properly afford alleged victims their procedur-
al rights under Mil. R. Evid. 412 should they
be allowed to petition for a writ of mandamus
under that rule. For the other articles and rules
enumerated under Article 6b(e), CCAs should
primarily focus on whether the alleged victim's
procedural rights under the articles and rules
were violated prior to ruling on any substantive
issues presented by the petition.
IV. ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF MANDAMUS
Once the petitioner shows the requested
writ is 'in aid of' the [CCA]'s existing jurisdic-
tion" and that he or she has standing to bring
the claim, the petitioner must next prove that
"the requested writ is 'necessary or appropri-
ate.""' For the purposes of this Part, the Author
will assume arguendo that the CCAs allow al-
leged victims to petition for writs of mandamus
on procedural and substantive claims of error
under the articles and rules under Article 6b(e)
(4).
A. Traditional Mandamus Standard of
Review for CCA Petitions
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy
that should be used in only extraordinary cir-
cumstances."o Otherwise, "every interlocutory
order which is wrong might be reviewed under
the All Writs Act. The office of a writ of manda-
mus would be enlarged to actually control the
9 Kastenberg, 72 M.J. at 367 (quoting Denedo, 66 M.J. at
119).
" ExparteRowland, 104 U.S. 604, 617 (1882) ("The gen-
eral principle which governs proceedings by mandamus
is, that whatever can be done without the employment
of that extraordinary remedy, may not be done with it. It
only lies when there is practically no other remedy.").
decision of the trial court rather than used in
its traditional function of confining a court to
its prescribed jurisdiction."91
Under military precedent, a "writ of
mandamus is a drastic instrument which
should be invoked only in truly extraordinary
situations."92 To establish that a writ of manda-
mus is necessary or appropriate, the petitioner
"must show that: (1) there is no other adequate
means to attain relief; (2) the right to issuance
of the writ is clear and indisputable; and (3) the
issuance of the writ is appropriate under the
circumstances."9 Petitioners bear the heavy
burden to show they have "'a clear and indis-
putable right'to the extraordinary relief" reque-
sted.9 ' Under this heightened standard, a CCA
must find a discretionary "judicial decision []
amount[s] to more than even 'gross error' in
order to reverse." Instead, only exception-
al circumstances amounting to a "clear abuse
of discretion or usurpation of judicial power .
justify the invocation of this extraordinary
remedy."96 A military judge exceeds his or her
discretionary power under a Military Rule of
Evidence if "by its very language, the rule of ev-
idence relied upon as the basis for [the judge's]
ruling can, under no circumstance as applied
to the limited issue presented to him, support
that ruling.""
9 BankersLife & Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379,
383 (1953).
92 United States v. Labella, 15 M.J. 228, 229 (C.M.A. 1983)
(per curiam) (citations omitted).
3 Hasan v. Gross, 71 M.J. 416, 418 (C.A.A.E 2012) (citing
Cheney v. United States Dist. CourtforD. C., 542 U.S. 367,
380-81 (2004)).
" Ponder v. Stone, 54 M.J. 613, 616 (N-M. Ct. Crim.
App. 2000) (quoting Aviz v. Carver, 36 M.J. 1026, 1028
(N.M.C.M.R. 1993); see also Will, 389 U.S. at 96.
95 Murray v. Haldeman, 16 M.J. 74, 76 (C.M.A. 1983)
(citations omitted).
96 Booker, 72 M.J. at 791.
97 United States v. Wade, 15 M.J. 993, 997 (N.M.C.M.R.
1983).
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B. Circuit Split on Standard of
Review for CVRA Petitions
The federal circuits are split on the
question of which standard. of review applies to
mandamus petitions brought under the CVRA.
Four circuits apply the traditional, heightened
mandamus standard." These circuits reason
that "Congress could have drafted the CVRA
to provide for 'immediate appellate review' or
'interlocutory appellate review,' something it
has done many times. Instead, it authorized
and made use of the term 'mandamus."'"When
Congress borrows terms of art in
which are accumulated the legal
tradition and meaning of cen-
turies of practice, it presumably
knows and adopts the cluster of
ideas that were attached to each
borrowed word in the body of
learning from which it was taken
and the meaning its use will con-
vey to the judicial mind unless
otherwise instructed.100
"Mandamus is the subject of longstand-
ing judicial precedent.""o' Courts should "'as-
sume that Congress knows the law and legis-
lates in light of federal court precedent."'1 02
Four other circuits apply an appellate
review standard of "abuse of discretion."10' The
98 See Monzel, 641 E3d at 533; In re Acker, 596 E3d 370,
372 (6th Cir. 2010);In re Dean, 527 E3d 391, 394 (5th
Cir. 2 008);In reAntrobus, 519 E3d 1123, 1129 (10th Cir.
2008).
99 In reAntrobus, 519 at 1124.
100 Id. (quotingMorisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246,
263 (1952)).
101 Id. at 1125.
102 Id (quotingBd. of nty. Comm'rs v. US. FE. 0. C, 405
E3d 840, 845 (10th Cir. 2005)).
103 See Kenna, 435 F3d at 1017 (reviewing petition under
the more generous "abuse of discretion or legal error"
standard); In re WR. HiffAsset Mgmt. Co., 409 E3d
555, 563 (2d Cir. 2005) (reviewing petition for abuse of
circuit courts that eschew the traditional man-
damus standard do so because they find "the
CVRA contemplates active review of orders
denying victims' rights claims even in routine
cases . . . The CVRA creates a unique regime
that does, in fact, contemplate routine interloc-
utory review of district court decisions deny-
ing rights asserted under the statute."1o' Since
those circuit courts find the CVRA creates a
presumption that courts of appeals will review
an alleged victim's petition, they find the victim
is not required to meet the heightened standard
of traditional mandamus review. Such courts is-
sue a writ of mandamus under the CVRA when-
ever they "find that the district court's order
reflects an abuse of discretion or legal error." 0 5
C. When a Writ of Mandamus Should
Issue for Violations of Articles and Rules
Enumerated Under Article 6b(e)(4)
CCAs should decline to depart from
CAAF precedent on writs of mandamus and
instead concur with the District of Columbia
Circuit that since "Congress called for 'man-
damus' strongly suggests it wanted 'manda-
mus."106 The case for the traditional mandamus
standard of review is particularly strong since
Congress knew of the circuit split on the inter-
pretation of the mandamus standard under the
CVRA and yet drafted Article 6b(e) to specifi-
discretion); see a/so In re Stewart, 552 E3d 1285, 1288-89
(11th Cir. 2008) (granting petition without asking wheth-
er victim had a clear and indisputable right to relief); In
re Wash, 229 Fed. Appx. 58, 60 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating in
dicta that "mandamus relief is available under a differ-
ent, and less demanding, standard under [CVRA]").
1o' Kenna, 435 E3d at 1017 ("The CVRA explicitly gives
victims aggrieved by a district court's order the right
to petition for review by writ of mandamus, provides
for expedited review of such a petition, allows a single
judge to make a decision thereon, and requires a rea-
soned decision in case the writ is denied.").
105 Id.
10 M~onze/, 641 FE3 at 533.
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cally state the victim may petition the CCA "for
a writ of mandamus." Furthermore, the Army
Court of Criminal Appeals recently applied the
heightened standard in its review of an alleged
victim's mandamus petition.10
1. Other Adequate Means to Attain Relief
Under the traditional mandamus stan-
dard, the petitioner must first show there is
no other adequate means to attain relief.10 Is-
suance of a writ of mandamus may be the only
available means for an alleged victim suffering
violations of his or her rights under the articles
and rules under Article 6b(e)(4) to attain the re-
lief requested. By requesting a writ of mandamus
for substantive issues under those rules, alleged
victims would complain of an improper ruling
to admit evidence of the petitioner's sexual his-
tory, conversations with a victim advocate, or
mental health records. The relief they request
is to keep that information private. Once such
evidence is admitted, the alleged victim's pri-
vacy rights, if violated, would be difficult, if not
impossible, to repair on appeal because the in-
formation would have already been disclosed at
a public trial.10o As a result, the relief requested
by such a petitioner would not be attainable on
direct review of any potential findings and sen-
tence approved by a convening authority under
Articles 66 or 69, UCMJ, because the loss in his
or her privacy interest would have already oc-
curred.
'0 LIpPert, No. 20150769, 2016 CCA LEXIS 63, at *5.
10 Hasan, 71 M.J. at 418 (citing Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380-
81).
'" See Doe, 666 E2d at 46 ("Without the right to im-
mediate appeal, victims aggrieved by the court's order
will have no opportunity to protect their privacy from
invasions forbidden by the rule. Appeal following the
defendant's acquittal or conviction is no remedy, for the
harm that the rule seeks to prevent already will have
occurred.").
Other alleged victims may complain that
the military judge did not provide them with
their procedural rights as required. CAAF has
already found there may be "no other mean-
ingful way for these issues to reach appellate
review."110
2. Clear and Indisputable Right to Issuance
of the Writ
Once the petitioner establishes there are
no other adequate means to attain relief, he or
she must next show that his or her right to "is-
suance of the writ is clear and indisputable.""'
Petitioners show a clear and indisputable right
to the issuance of a writ of mandamus, if the
military judge's discretionary "judicial decision
amounts to more than even 'gross error'" 1 12 and
is a "usurpation of judicial power.""'
For a procedural claim of error under
Mil. R. Evid. 412, the petitioner must show that
the military judge did not allow the petitioner
one of his or her procedural rights, such as the
right to be present and heard at the hearing. "A
reasonable opportunity to be heard at a hear-
ing includes the right to present facts and le-
gal argument, and that a victim or patient who
is represented by counsel. be heard through
counsel.""
To prevail on a substantive claim of er-
ror under Mil. R. Evid. 412, the petitioner must
show the military judge usurped his or her ju-
dicial authority in admitting evidence in viola-
tion of the petitioner's right to privacy. Mil. R.
Evid. 4 12 (a) is a rule of exclusion, which pro-
vides that, unless an exception applies, "[e]vi-
"o Kastenberg, 72 M.J. at 372.
.. Hasan, 71 M.J. at 418 (citing Cieney, 542 U.S. at 380-
81).
n2 Murray, 16 M.J. at 76 (citations omitted).
113 Booker, 72 M.J. at 791.
11n Kasienberg, 72 M.J. at 370.
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dence offered to prove that any alleged victim
engaged in other sexual behavior" is "not ad-
missible in any proceeding involving an alleged
sexual offense.""'
The rule provides three exceptions. "[D]
efense counsel has the burden of demonstrat-
ing why the general prohibition in [Mil. R.
Evid.] 412 should be lifted to admit evidence of
the sexual behavior of the victim .. ."16 "In par-
ticular, the proponent must demonstrate how
the evidence fits within one of the exceptions
to the rule.""' If the military judge performs
the proper analysis on the record under each
exception, his or her discretionary ruling ad-
mitting or excluding such evidence will rarely
amount to a usurpation of judicial authority.1 8
First, Mil. R. Evid. 412(b)(1)(A) allows the
entry of "evidence of specific instances of sexual
behavior by the alleged victim offered to prove
that a person other than the accused was the
source of semen, injury, or other physical evi-
dence." For example, evidence that the alleged
"' Ellerbrock, 70 M.J. at 322 (citation omitted) (find-
ing several legitimate interests in the military context
support Mil. R. Evid. 412's limitation of an accused to
present relevant testimony, including "a societal interest
in the reporting and prosecution of sexual offenses and
maintenance of a justice system that is fair to both the
accused and to the victims. They also include mainte-
nance of good order and discipline in the military as
well as the morale and welfare of those who serve in the
armed forces").
"' United States v. Moulton, 47 M.J. 227, 228 (C.A.A.E
1997).
"' Banker, 60 M.J. at 222 (citing Moulton, 47 M.J. at 228-
29).
"I A military judge's proper analysis generally is not
even overturned under the lower ahuse of discretion
standard. See, e.g., Banker, 60 M.J at 225 ("In the context
of M.R.E. 412, it was within the judge's discretion to
determine that such a cursory argument did not suffi-
ciently articulate how the testimony reasonably estab-
lished a motive to fabricate."); Moulton, 47 M.J. at 228
(agreeing with CCA that military judge did not abuse
his discretion in precluding further questioning under
Mil. R. Evid. 412 because the defense had failed "to ar-
ticulate a theory of admissibility").
victim had sexual intercourse with another
person on the same evening as the alleged sex-
ual assault by the accused would be admissible
under this subsection to show that the other
person may have caused the victim's injuries
that the victim attributed to the accused. Sec-
ond, "evidence of specific instances of sexual
behavior by the alleged victim with respect to
the person accused of the sexual misconduct
[can be] offered by the accused to prove con-
sent or by the prosecution."119 For example, ev-
idence that the alleged victim had consensual
sex with the accused on the morning prior to
the alleged sexual assault may be admissible to
show the victim consented to the sexual con-
duct at issue. Under the first and second ex-
ceptions, the military judge is also required to
perform the Mil. R. Evid. 412(c)(3) balancing
test: to determine whether the probative value
of the evidence outweighs the danger of unfair
prejudice to the petitioner's privacy. The mili-
tary judge must also review the admissibility of
the evidence under Mil. R. Evid. 401 and 403.120
The third exception under Mil. R. Evid.
412(b)(1)(C) allows evidence of prior sexual acts
that is "constitutionally required."12' Evidence
is constitutionally required if it is "essential to a
fair trial." 22 Under this exception, the "'alleged
victim's privacy' interests cannot preclude the
admission of evidence 'the exclusion of which
would violate the constitutional rights of the
accused.""'3 Therefore, the military judge is
nI Mil. R. Evid. 412(b)(1)(B3).
120 Mil. R. Evid. 412(c)(3); see United States v. Andreozzi,
60 M.J. 727, 738 (A.C.C.A. 2004) (citing Banker, 60 M.J.
at 220).
121 See, e.g., United States v. Gray, 40 M.J. 77, 80 (C.M.A.
1994) (finding abuse of discretion to exclude evidence
that same 9-year-old girl who was currently accusing
defendant of rape had previously falsely accused him of
rape).
122 Ellerbrock, 70 M.J. at 322.
123 Gaddis, 70 M.J. at 250 (citing Mil. R. Evid. 412(b)(1)
(C)).
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not required to perform a Mil. R. Evid. 412(c)(3)
balancing test to determine whether the proba-
tive value of the evidence outweighs the danger
of unfair prejudice to the petitioner's privacy.124
"In order to properly determine whether
evidence is admissible under the constitution-
ally required exception the military judge must
evaluate whether the proffered evidence is rel-
evant, material, and favorable to the defense." 125
The military judge must then conduct a Mil. R.
Evid. 403 balancing test. 126 If a military judge
"does not sufficiently articulate [the Mil. R.
Evid. 403] balancing on the record, his [or her]
evidentiary ruling will receive less deference
from" appellate courts.127 The military judge's
decision to admit Mil. R. Evid. 412 evidence is
further safeguarded by a determination that a
reasonable panel might receive a significantly
different impression of the petitioner's credi-
bility if defense counsel was permitted to in-
quire into the other sexual behavior.128
An accused has the constitutional right
"to be confronted by the witnesses against
him."129 That right includes the right to cross-ex-
124 See id. (For example, the military judge can find the
evidence to be constitutionally required in order to
preserve the accused's rights to confrontation and due
process).
125 United States v. Smith, 68 M.J. 445, 452 (C.A.A.E 2010)
(citation omitted).
126 Ellerbrock, 70 M.J. at 319 (citations omitted) (finding
the probative value of the evidence must outweigh the
danger of unfair prejudice, to include "'harassment,
prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety,
or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally
relevant").
127 United States v. Berry, 61 M.J. 91, 96 (C.A.A.E 2005)
(citations omitted).
128 See Gaddis, 70 M.J. at 256 (quoting Del. v. Van Arsdall,
475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986)); United States v. Dorsey, 16 M.J.
1, 7 (C.M.A. 1983) (concluding that the judge erred in
excluding relevant evidence that "would have had a rea-
sonable likelihood of affecting the judgment of the trier
of fact").
129 U.S. Const. amend. VI.
amine those witnesses.1 30 "'[T]he exposure of
a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper
and important function of the constitutionally
protected right of cross-examination."' 3 "[A] n
accused's Confrontation Clause rights are vi-
olated when a reasonable jury might have re-
ceived a significantly different impression of
the witness's credibility had defense counsel
been permitted to pursue his proposed line of
cross-examination."1 3 2 To cross-examine a wit-
ness on a subject, the proponent must estab-
lish the subject has "a direct nexus to the case
that is rooted in the record."1 33
Evidence of motive is relevant and es-
sential to the trier of fact to determine the peti-
tioner's reason for reporting the alleged sexual
assault at issue. "There is little question that
... the credibility of the putative victim is of
paramount importance, and that a statement by
that person that she had made up some or all
of the allegations to get attention might cause
members to have a significantly different view
of her credibility."134 Generally, Article 120,
UCMJ, charges concern the accused's conduct
with the petitioner, the only other witness to
the activity in question. In such a scenario, the
petitioner's credibility is central to the govern-
ment's case. Under those circumstances, mili-
tary judges are more likely to find that evidence
is constitutionally required and petitioners are
less likely to show the military judge usurped
his or her judicial authority in admitting the
evidence.
130 Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted).
"' Id. at 678-79 (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308,
316 (1974)).
"2 United States v. Jasper, 72 M.J. 276, 281 (C.A.A.E
2013) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
1' United States v. Sullivan, 70 M.J. 110, 115 (C.A.A.E
2011).
" Jasper, 72 M.J. at 281.
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To prevail on a claim of error under Mil. R.
Evid. 513 or 514, the petitioner must show
the military judge usurped his or her judicial
authority in admitting evidence in violation
of the petitioner's psychotherapist-patient or
victim-victim advocate privilege or procedural
rights under those rules. Under Mil. R. Evid.
513(d), the psychotherapist-patient privilege
does not apply in seven circumstances:
(1) when the patient is dead;
(2) when the communication is
evidence of child abuse or of
neglect, or in a proceeding in
which one spouse is charged
with a crime against a child of
either spouse;
(3) when federal law, state law, or
service regulation imposes a duty
to report information contained
in a communication;
(4) when a psychotherapist ... be-
lieves that a patient's mental or
emotional condition makes the
patient a danger to any person,
including the patient;
(5) if the communication clearly
contemplated the future com-
mission of a fraud or crime or if
the services of the psychother-
apist are sought or obtained to
enable or aid anyone to commit
or plan to commit what the pa-
tient knew or reasonably should
have known to be a crime or
fraud;
(6) when necessary to ensure the
safety and security of military
personnel, military dependents,
military property, classified infor-
mation, or the accomplishment
of a military mission;
(7) when an accused offers state-
ments or other evidence con-
cerning his mental condition in
defense, extenuation, or mitiga-
tion ...
11 Until 2015, there had always been an eighth excep-
tion: "(8) when admission or disclosure of a commni-
cation is constitutionally required." However, the 2015
NDAA struck that exception. See § 537. That change
may be unconstitutional because, in many cases, it
would violate the accused's right to confrontation. See,
e.g., Davis, 415 U.S. at 320 ("The State's policy interest
in protecting the confidentiality of a juvenile offender's
record cannot require yielding of so vital a constitution-
al right as the effective cross-examination for bias of an
adverse witness."); United States v. Lindstrom, 698 E2d
1154, 1167 (11th Cir. 1.983) ("While we recognize the
general validity of those interests, they are not absolute
and, in the context of this criminal trial, must 'yield to
the paramount right of the defense to cross-examine ef-
fectively the witness in a criminal case."'). The Supreme
Court has not squarely addressed this issue. See Swidler
& Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 408 n.3 (1998) (not
addressing whether "exceptional circunistances impli-
cating a criminal defendant's constitutional rights might
warrant breaching the [attorney- client] privilege"); Jaffee
v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17 (1996) (holding, in a civil case,
the psychotherapist-patient privilege is not subject to a
test balancing "the relative importance of the patient's
interest in privacy and the evidentiary need for disclo-
sure"); Johnson v. Norris, 537 E3d 840, 846 (8th Cir. 2008)
(finding that, although "in at least some circumstances,
an accused's constitutional rights are paramount to a
State's interest in protecting confidential information, .
[there is no] specific legal rule that answers whether
a State's psychotherapist-patient privilege must yield
to an accused's desire to use confidential information
in defense of a criminal case"); Sullivan, 70 M.J. at 117
(citing Lindstrom, 698 E2d at 1165-66) ("In sexual assault
cases, evidence of an alleged victim's psychological
condition could directly impact the members' impres-
sions of the accused's mistake of fact as to consent, the
alleged victim's credibility in making the accusation,
and the alleged victim's consent to the alleged sexual
assault. CAAF has found a witness's psychological state
'should be admitted if it relates to the witness's ability
to perceive events and testify accurately."'); see infra Part
V( Psychological evidence regarding the sexual assault
complainant, especially if he or she was diagnosed with
an attention-seeking disorder, bipolar disorder, or some
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When a party seeks to admit evidence
covered under the psychotherapist-patient
privilege, Mil. R. Evid. 513(e)(2)13 6 provides the
patient with the following procedural rights: "a
reasonable opportunity to attend the hearing
and be heard," which "includes the right to be
heard through counsel," and the opportunity
to call witnesses and present evidence.' Be-
fore ordering production of or admitting such
evidence, the military judge "must conduct a
hearing, which shall be closed.1 38 The military
judge may examine the patient's records in
camera and may issue protective orders con-
cerning the evidence or "admit only portions
of the evidence."13 "Any production or disclo-
sure permitted by the military judge must be
narrowly tailored to only the specific records
or communications . . . that meet the require-
ments for one of the enumerated exceptions to
"1140
the privilege ...
Under Mil. R. Evid. 514, a victim or vic-
tim advocate can claim a privilege to the vic-
tim's confidential communications with a vic-
tim advocate." The privilege does not apply in
six circumstances: (1) if the victim is dead; (2)
if there is a duty to report under law; (3) if the
other disorder that could have impacted someone's
lack of memory of their consent later, could be integral
to the accused's defense. Such psychological evidence
would also contribute to the fact finder's analysis as to
whether a person falsified a complaint to obtain sympa-
thy and attention or for other personal reasons).
"6 Mil. R. Evid. 513(e)(2) (Supp. 2015).
13 Mil. R. Evid. 513(e)(2) (2012 ed. & Supp. 2013) (Prior
to Exec. Order No. 13,696, Mil. R. Evid. 513(e)(2) only
provided the patient "a reasonable opportunity to
attend the hearing and be heard at the patient's own
expense unless . . . subpoenaed." That rule was formerly
only permissive in that the military judge did not have
to but "may order the hearing closed." Finally, the rule
formerly did not require production or disclosure of
psychological records to be narrowly tailored).
1 Mil. R. Evid. 513(e)(2) (Supp. 2015).
'3 Id. at subsection (3), (5).
140 Id. at subsection (4).
"'I Mil. R. Evid. 514(a), (c) (Supp. 2015).
advocate believes the victim may be a danger to
any person, including the victim; (4) if the com-
munication clearly contemplated the future
commission of a fraud or crime; (5) when nec-
essary to ensure the safety and security of mili-
tary personnel, property, or information; and (6)
when disclosure is constitutionally required.""
Before communications between a victim and
his or her victim advocate may be produced
to the defense or admitted as evidence at tri-
al, the court must hold a closed hearing, where
the victim has a right to be in attendance and
heard." Any disclosure of such information
must be "narrowly tailored" to meet one of the
six exceptions to the privilege and to the stated
use of the information."4
Petitioners may also attempt to claim a
privilege in their restricted reports14 5 of sexual
assault that do not pertain to the case at tri-
al under Mil. R. Evid. 514.1" Such petitioners
may request a writ of mandamus if they believe
the military judge did not adequately protect
their restricted reports from the defense or
from release. An alleged victim's communica-
tions to his or her victim advocate "made for
the purpose of facilitating advice or supportive
assistance to the victim" are confidential com-
to Id. at subsection (d).
s Id. at subsection (e)(2 ).
" Id. at subsection (4).
1 Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 6495.02
at 92 (Mar. 28, 2013) (incorporating Change 1, Feb. 12,
2014) ("Restricted reporting" is defined as a "[r]eporting
option that allows sexual assault victims to confidential-
ly disclose the assault to specified individuals ... and
receive medical treatment, including emergency care,
counseling, and assignment of a [sexual assault re-
sponse coordinator] SARC and [sexual assault preven-
tion and response victim advocate] SAPR VA, without
triggering an investigation.").
"6 For example, this argument could be that a military
judge abused her discretion in reviewing the petition-
er's restricted reports of sexual assault in camera and in
subsequently releasing these reports to the defense.
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munications protected by Mil. R. Evid. 514."'
However, "[c]ommunications between the vic-
tim and a person other than the SARC, SAPR
VA, or healthcare personnel are NOT confi-
dential and do not receive the protections of
Restricted Reporting.""4
The rights given to victims under Mil.
R. Evid. 615(e) and Articles 6b and 32, UCMJ,
are primarily procedural. Under Mil. R. Evid.
615(e), a victim of an offense cannot be exclud-
ed from a trial of an accused for that offense
"unless the military judge, after receiving clear
and convincing evidence, determines that testi-
mony by the victim would be materially altered
if the victim heard other testimony at that hear-
ing or proceeding."149 Article 32, UCMJ, states
that the victim will not be forced to testify at
a preliminary hearing and allows the victim to
obtain a copy of a recording of the preliminary
hearing.
A petition that effectively proves a clear
and indisputable right to the issuance of the
writ would clearly state how the military judge
usurped his or her judicial authority at any of
the decision points under the articles and rules.
3. Issuance Is Appropriate under
the Circumstances
Finally, the petitioner must establish
that the issuance of the writ is appropriate un-
der the circumstances. 10 Courts analyze at least
two separate factors to determine whether the
issuance of the writ is appropriate. First, is the
lower court's ruling "an oft-repeated error" or
likely to reoccur; in other words, does it "mani-
14 DoDI 6495.02 at Enclosure 4, [ 1(b)(4).
1s Id. at 1 (e)(2).
"9 (Supp. 2015).
150 Hasan, 71 M.J. at 418 (citing Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380-
81).
fest[] a persistent disregard of federal rules"?15 1
Second, does "[tjhe lower court's order raise[J
new and important problems, or issues of law
of first impression"?1 5 2 The CCA is more likely
to grant a petitioner's petition for a writ of man-
damus if the military judge's decision is likely to
reoccur and/or raises new issues that have not
been previously addressed on appellate review.
V. FALSE COMPLAINTS OF SEXUAL AssAULT
False complaints of sexual assault cause
practitioners confusion. Alleged victims may
attempt to petition CCAs on these matters.
However, under Article 6b, petitioners do not
have standing to seek writs of mandamus con-
cerning military judges' rulings on admission
of false complaints of sexual assault.
As stated in the drafter's analysis of Mil.
R. Evid. 412, evidence of past false complaints
of sexual assault by an alleged victim does not
fall within the protections of Mil. R. Evid. 412
and is "not objectionable when otherwise ad-
missible."153 Therefore, an alleged victim does
not have standing to petition the admission of
evidence of a false complaint under Article 6b.
Insofar as the allegations are proven to be false
by a preponderance of the evidence15 1 and the
evidence to be presented at trial does not in-
1' Dew v. United States, 48 M.J. 639, 649 (A.C.C.A. 1998)
(citingIn reAm. Med. Sys.,Inc., 75 E3d 1069, 1078 (6th
Cir. 1996); Bauman v. United States Dist. Ct., 557 E2d 650,
654-55 (9th Cir. 1977)); see also Booker, 72 M.J. at 807.
152 Dew, 48 M.J. at 649 (citations omitted); Booker, 72
M.J. at 807 (providing "we are aware that the circum-
stances present here have not been addressed in any
decision revealed in the parties' pleadings or by this
court").
'5 MCM, App. 22-36; Mil. R. Evid. 412.
154 R.C.M. 801(e)(4) ("Questions of fact in an interlocutory
question shall be determined by a preponderance of the
evidence, unless otherwise stated in this Manual. In the
absence of a rule in this Manual assigning the burden of
persuasion, the party making the motion or raising the
objection shall bear the burden of persuasion.").
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clude other evidence protected under Mil. R.
Evid. 412, the military judge is not required to
conduct a Mil. R. Evid. 412 analysis in order to
admit such evidence." Even if the CCA decides
to review a petition concerning the admission
of a false complaint, a military judge has not
usurped his or her judicial authority in admit-
ting that evidence after the complaint is proven
to be false by a preponderance of the evidence.
Defense counsel should not overlook the
false complaint exception to Mil. R. Evid. 412.
The three major reasons an alleged victim would
file a false sexual assault complaint include "pro-
viding an alibi, seeking revenge, and obtaining
sympathy and attention. 15' At least one schol-
ar has written that false rape allegations "reflect
impulsive and desperate efforts to cope with
personal and social stress situations.""' Military
culture is rife with personal and social stress
situations, including being far from loved ones,
uprooted every two to four years, and sent on
deployments to war zones and onboard military
ships. At the same time, the military climate pro-
vides several potential economic and personal
incentives for an alleged victim to falsely report
a sexual assault. First, a report can enable a false
complainant to avoid, or return early from, a
deployment or be moved from a command or
a duty location the alleged victim does not like.
If the complainant files an unrestricted report,
meaning the alleged offender would be inves-
tigated and that investigation could ultimately
lead to a court-martial, the alleged victim is en-
titled to immediate transfer to another duty sta-
tion, including off of a deployment or ship that
is at sea.1 8
155 MCM, Appendix 22-36; Mil. R. Evid. 412.
15 See Eugene J. Kanin, Fase Rape Allegations, 23.1
Archives of Sexual Behavior 81, 81 (1994).
Id.
15s DoDI 6495.02 at 5 ("Service members who file an
Unrestricted Report of sexual assault shall be informed
... at the time of making the report, or as soon as prac-
Second, false complainants can use their
complaint to avoid personal misconduct.1 59 For
example, if service members from the same
command had a consensual sexual relation-
ship, one could accuse the other of sexual as-
sault to avoid personal fraternization charges.
The stakes for a service member facing disci-
pline are high in the context of the military jus-
tice system. Charges of misconduct could lead
to the service member's non-judicial punish-
ment, where the person's military commander
can adjudge several punishments, including
but not limited to forfeiture of pay, reduction
to an inferior pay grade, restriction to specified
limits, and extra duties.1" Charges of miscon-
duct could also subject the service member to
loss of their military career through adminis-
trative separation, which can result in some-
thing other than an honorable discharge, or a
federal crime, and its attendant punishments
and consequences, by court-martial.
Third, an alleged victim-complainant
has access to medical and psychological ser-
vices, including potential medical separation
with disability benefits. Because "[s]exual as-
sault victims shall be given priority, and treated
as emergency cases,"'"' a person who regretted
engaging in a consensual one-night stand could
claim sexual assault to jump to the first of the
line to obtain birth control and/or a sexually
transmitted disease check. In such a scenario,
false complainants may feel more comfortable
saying they were sexually assaulted to avoid the
ticable, of the option to request a temporary or perma-
nent expedited transfer from their assigned command
or installation . . .").
'' Id. at 42, Encl. 5, ¶ 7(a) ("Commanders shall have dis-
cretion to defer action on alleged collateral misconduct
by the sexual assault victims (and shall not be penalized
for such a deferral decision), until final disposition of
the sexual assault case, . . . so as to encourage reporting
of sexual assault and continued victim cooperation . .
'6 MCM, PartV(5).
1' DoDI 6495.02 at 4, $ 4(1).
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potential judgment they may receive if they just
stated the truth.
VI. CONCLUSION
Because the landscape surrounding sex-
ual assault cases is frequently changing, practi-
tioners must be aware of all changes to the law.
Several of the changes in the 2014-2016 NDAAs
and subsequent executive orders have potential
constitutional implications and consequences
for both defendants and alleged victims.
CCAs have jurisdiction to hear any writ
of mandamus brought forward by an alleged vic-
tim under those articles and rules enumerated
in Article 6b(e)(4). However, the Constitution
requires, and a comparison between the CVRA
and Article 6b along with a review of the plain
reading of the statutes and historical precedent
highlights, that CCAs strictly construe statutes
providing standing to file a writ of mandamus.1 62
A petitioner may request a writ of manda-
mus if a military judge does not afford the peti-
tioner procedural rights under Mil. R. Evid. 412.
However, petitioners should not be granted stand-
ing to claim the military judge abused his or her
discretion on substantive Mil. R. Evid. 412 matters
because, although Mil. R. Evid. 412 may general-
ly protect an alleged victim's privacy interest, that
protection does not rise to the level of a right. For
the other articles and rules enumerated under Ar-
ticle 6b(e), CCAs should primarily focus on wheth-
er the alleged victim's procedural rights under the
articles and rules were violated prior to ruling on
any substantive issues presented by the petition.
The heightened mandamus standard
should be used to review alleged victims' pe-
titions for writs of mandamus under Article
6b. Under that standard, the petitioner "must
162 See Will, 389 U.S. at 96-97; Carroll, 354 U.S. at 415.
show that: (1) there is no other adequate means
to attain relief; (2) the right to issuance of the
writ is clear and indisputable; and (3) the issu-
ance of the writ is appropriate under the cir-
cumstances." 63 The alleged victim most likely
will be able to meet the first prong in claims of
violations of the applicable articles and rules
under Article 6b(e)(4). The most difficult prong
for the petitioner to meet is the second one be-
cause the military judge's decision must have
amounted to more than "gross error 64 : it must
have been a "usurpation of judicial power."
Finally, if the petitioner meets the first and the
second prong, the CCA may not grant a writ
of mandamus unless the same type of usurpa-
tion of judicial power is likely to reoccur and/or
raises new issues that have not been previously
addressed on appellate review.
False allegations of sexual assault present
additional challenges for practitioners. False com-
plaints do not fall under Mil. R. Evid. 412, and,
thus, claims regarding their improper admission
should not be taken up on a writ to a CCA.
Aspects of Congress' new, wide-sweeping
changes to military justice legislation encroach
upon, and sometimes violate, the constitution-
al protections historically afforded to criminal
defendants at courts-martial. At trial and on in-
terlocutory appeal, an accused is entitled to the
presumption of innocence unless and until he
or she is eventually proven guilty by "reasonable
and competent evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt."'6 By granting standing to alleged victims
only under the specific circumstances outlined
under Article 6b, CCAs provide an appropriate
rampart against the heavy weight of sexual as-
sault charges upon an accused.
63 Rasan, 71 M.J. at 418 (citing Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380-81).
164 Murray, 16 M.J. at 76 (citations omitted).
165 Booker, 72 M.J. at 791 (citations omitted).
'66 UCMJ, Article 51(c)(1).
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